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diff --git a/doc/handbook/chapters/keyconcepts.texi b/doc/handbook/chapters/keyconcepts.texi index eb95dbf78..f429997bf 100644 --- a/doc/handbook/chapters/keyconcepts.texi +++ b/doc/handbook/chapters/keyconcepts.texi | |||
@@ -152,6 +152,7 @@ and @pxref{Deniability}. | |||
152 | 152 | ||
153 | @menu | 153 | @menu |
154 | * How file-sharing achieves Anonymity:: | 154 | * How file-sharing achieves Anonymity:: |
155 | * How messaging provides Anonymity:: | ||
155 | @end menu | 156 | @end menu |
156 | 157 | ||
157 | Providing anonymity for users is the central goal for the anonymous | 158 | Providing anonymity for users is the central goal for the anonymous |
@@ -231,6 +232,30 @@ GAP --- practical anonymous networking. In Proceedings of | |||
231 | Designing Privacy Enhancing Technologies, 2003. | 232 | Designing Privacy Enhancing Technologies, 2003. |
232 | (@uref{https://git.gnunet.org/bibliography.git/plain/docs/aff.pdf, https://git.gnunet.org/bibliography.git/plain/docs/aff.pdf}) | 233 | (@uref{https://git.gnunet.org/bibliography.git/plain/docs/aff.pdf, https://git.gnunet.org/bibliography.git/plain/docs/aff.pdf}) |
233 | 234 | ||
235 | @cindex How messaging provides Anonymity | ||
236 | @node How messaging provides Anonymity | ||
237 | @subsection How messaging provides Anonymity | ||
238 | |||
239 | While the file-sharing tries to achieve anonymity through hiding actions in | ||
240 | other traffic, the messaging service provides a weaker form of protection | ||
241 | against identification. | ||
242 | |||
243 | The messaging service allows the use of an anonymous ego for the signing and | ||
244 | verification process of messages instead of a unique ego. This anonymous ego is | ||
245 | a publically known key pair which is shared between all peers in GNUnet. | ||
246 | |||
247 | Using this ego only ensures that individual messages alone can't identify its | ||
248 | sender inside of a messenger room. It should be clarified that the route of | ||
249 | the traffic for each message can still be tracked to identify the senders peer | ||
250 | inside of a messenger room if the threat agent controls certain peers hosting | ||
251 | the room. | ||
252 | |||
253 | Also opening a room in the messenger service will potentially match your peer | ||
254 | identity with the internal member identity from the messenger service. So | ||
255 | despite using the anonymous ego you can reveal your peer identity. This means | ||
256 | to decrease the chance of being identified, it is recommended to enter rooms but | ||
257 | you should not open them for others. | ||
258 | |||
234 | @cindex Deniability | 259 | @cindex Deniability |
235 | @node Deniability | 260 | @node Deniability |
236 | @section Deniability | 261 | @section Deniability |