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-rw-r--r--draft-schanzen-gns.xml96
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diff --git a/draft-schanzen-gns.xml b/draft-schanzen-gns.xml
index 35cbd49..94942c2 100644
--- a/draft-schanzen-gns.xml
+++ b/draft-schanzen-gns.xml
@@ -89,10 +89,9 @@
89 <t> 89 <t>
90 This document contains the GNU Name System (GNS) technical 90 This document contains the GNU Name System (GNS) technical
91 specification. 91 specification.
92 GNS is a decentralized and censorship-resistant name 92 GNS is a decentralized and censorship-resistant domain name
93 system that provides a privacy-enhancing alternative to the Domain 93 resolution protocol that provides a privacy-enhancing alternative to the
94 Name System (DNS). 94 Domain Name System (DNS) protocols.
95 <!-- GNS is more. it is also extensible and more flexible -->
96 </t> 95 </t>
97 <t> 96 <t>
98 This document defines the normative wire format of resource records, 97 This document defines the normative wire format of resource records,
@@ -114,57 +113,36 @@
114 <t> 113 <t>
115 The Domain Name System (DNS) <xref target="RFC1035" /> is a unique 114 The Domain Name System (DNS) <xref target="RFC1035" /> is a unique
116 distributed database and a vital service for most Internet applications. 115 distributed database and a vital service for most Internet applications.
117 While DNS is distributed, in practice it 116 However, it was not designed with security in mind. This makes it very
118 relies on centralized, trusted registrars to provide globally unique
119 names. As the awareness of the central role DNS plays on the Internet
120 rises, various institutions are using their power (including legal means)
121 to engage in attacks on the DNS, thus threatening the global availability
122 and integrity of information on the Internet.
123 </t>
124 <t>
125 DNS was not designed with security in mind. This makes it very
126 vulnerable, especially to attackers that have the technical capabilities 117 vulnerable, especially to attackers that have the technical capabilities
127 of an entire nation state at their disposal. 118 of an entire nation state at their disposal.
128 While a wider discussion of this issue is out of scope for this document,
129 analyses and investigations can be found in recent academic research
130 works including <xref target="SecureNS"/>.
131 </t> 119 </t>
132 <t> 120 <t>
133 This specification describes a censorship-resistant, privacy-preserving 121 This specification describes a censorship-resistant, privacy-preserving
134 and decentralized name system: The GNU Name System (GNS) <xref target="GNS" />. 122 and decentralized domain name resolution protocol:
135 It is designed to provide a secure, privacy-enhancing alternative to 123 The GNU Name System (GNS), a development continuation of
136 DNS, especially when censorship or manipulation is encountered. 124 previous academic work on secure name systems <xref target="GNS" />.
137 In particular, it directly addresses concerns in DNS with respect to "Query
138 Privacy", the "Single Hierarchy with a Centrally Controlled Root" and
139 "Distribution and Management of Root Servers" as raised in
140 <xref target="RFC8324"/>.
141 GNS can bind names to any kind of 125 GNS can bind names to any kind of
142 cryptographically secured token, enabling it to double in some respects as 126 cryptographically secured token, enabling it to double in some respects as
143 an alternative to some of today’s Public Key Infrastructures, in 127 an alternative to some of today’s Public Key Infrastructures, in
144 particular X.509 for the Web. 128 particular X.509 for the Web.
145 </t> 129 </t>
146 <t> 130 <t>
147 The design of GNS incorporates the capability to integrate and 131 The design of GNS incorporates the capability to interoperate with the
148 coexist with DNS. 132 DNS protocol.
149 GNS is based on the principle of a petname system where users can assign 133 It is based on the principle of a petname system where users can assign
150 names to zones. 134 names to zones.
151 It builds on ideas from the Simple Distributed Security 135 It builds on ideas from the Simple Distributed Security
152 Infrastructure <xref target="SDSI" />, addressing a central issue with the decentralized 136 Infrastructure <xref target="SDSI" />, enabling the decentralized
153 mapping of secure identifiers to memorable names: namely the impossibility 137 mapping of secure identifiers to memorable names.
154 of providing a global, secure and memorable mapping without a trusted
155 authority. GNS uses the transitivity in the SDSI design to replace the
156 trusted root with secure delegation of authority thus making petnames
157 useful to other users while operating under a very strong adversary model.
158 </t> 138 </t>
159 <t> 139 <t>
160 This is an important distinguishing factor from the Domain Name System
161 where root zone governance is centralized at the Internet Corporation
162 for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN).
163 In DNS terminology, GNS roughly follows the idea of a local 140 In DNS terminology, GNS roughly follows the idea of a local
164 root zone deployment (see <xref target="RFC8806"/>), with the difference that it is not 141 root zone deployment (see <xref target="RFC8806"/>), with the difference
165 expected that all deployments use the same root zone, 142 that the protocol defined here does not mandate that all deployments use
166 and that users can easily delegate control of arbitrary domain names to 143 the same root zone.
167 arbitrary zones. 144 Users can easily delegate control of arbitrary domain names to
145 arbitrary zones through their local configurations.
168 </t> 146 </t>
169 <t> 147 <t>
170 This document defines the normative wire format of resource records, resolution processes, 148 This document defines the normative wire format of resource records, resolution processes,
@@ -2751,6 +2729,46 @@ NICK: john (Supplemental)
2751 zone keys do become public during revocation. 2729 zone keys do become public during revocation.
2752 </t> 2730 </t>
2753 </section> 2731 </section>
2732 <section anchor="sec_governance">
2733 <name>Zone Governance</name>
2734 <t>
2735 While DNS is distributed, in practice it
2736 relies on centralized, trusted registrars to provide globally unique
2737 names. As the awareness of the central role DNS plays on the Internet
2738 rises, various institutions are using their power (including legal means)
2739 to engage in attacks on the DNS, thus threatening the global availability
2740 and integrity of information on the Internet.
2741 While a wider discussion of this issue is out of scope for this document,
2742 analyses and investigations can be found in recent academic research
2743 works including <xref target="SecureNS"/>.
2744 </t>
2745 <t>
2746 GNS is designed to provide a secure, privacy-enhancing alternative to the
2747 DNS name resolution protocol, especially when censorship or manipulation
2748 is encountered.
2749 In particular, it directly addresses concerns in DNS with respect to
2750 query privacy.
2751 However, depending on the governance of the root zone, any deployment
2752 will likely suffer from the issues of a
2753 "Single Hierarchy with a Centrally Controlled Root" and
2754 "Distribution and Management of Root Servers" as raised in
2755 <xref target="RFC8324"/>.
2756 In the Domain Name System root zone governance is centralized at the
2757 Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN).
2758 GNS can be used to leverage the transitivity in the SDSI design to
2759 replace the trusted root with secure delegation of authority thus
2760 making petnames useful to other users while operating under a very
2761 strong adversary model.
2762 By building on the ideas from SDSI, GNS allows to address a central
2763 issue with the decentralized mapping of secure identifiers to memorable
2764 names: namely the impossiblity of providing a global, secure and
2765 memorable mapping without a trusted authority.
2766 </t>
2767 <t>
2768 Any GNS implementation <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> provide a default
2769 governance model in the form of an initial start zone mapping.
2770 </t>
2771 </section>
2754 <section anchor="namespace_ambiguity"> 2772 <section anchor="namespace_ambiguity">
2755 <name>Namespace Ambiguity</name> 2773 <name>Namespace Ambiguity</name>
2756 <t> 2774 <t>