The GNU Name System

Christian Grothoff

Inria Rennes Bretagne Atlantique

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"Never doubt your ability to change the world." -Glenn Greenwald



Where We Are





Where We Are





A Matter of Life and Death

The Intercept reports in February 2014:



- ► NSA identifies targets based on meta data (social graph, location profiles, cell-phone tracking)
- Content of calls and identity of individuals is often not even considered
- Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) uses geolocation of SIM card for assassinations using drone strikes
- Individual in possession of SIM card is sometimes not even identified prior to strike

"F3: Find, Fix, Finish" is state terrorism facilitated by networks.









(U) What is MORECOWBELL?

- (S//REL) MORECOWBELL (MCB) is a V43 developed system used to support V3 and JFCC-Network Warfare Operations
- (S//REL) Built on the PACKAGEDGOODS infrastructure and cover mechanisms.
- (S//REL) Deployed on a covered infrastructure on the public Internet
- (S//REL) Performs DNS lookups and HTTP requests against targets on regular intervals
- (S//REL) Used to track changes to DNS resolution as well as up/down status of websites

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL FVEY





(U) How Does it Work?

- (U) Consists of:
 - (U//FOUO) Central tasking system housed in V43 office Spaces
 - (S//REL) Several covertly rented web servers (referred to as bots) in: Malaysia, Germany, and Denmark
- (S//REL) The MCB bots utilize open DNS resolvers to perform thousands of DNS lookups every hour.
- (S//REL) MCB bots have the ability to perform HTTP GET requests (mimicking a user's web browser)
- (S//REL) The data is pulled back to the NSA every 15-30 minutes
- (S//REL) Data Currently available on NSANet via web services

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL FVEY





(U) Benefits

- (S//REL) MCB enables the NTOC to monitor thousands of Internet websites in near realtime
 - (S//REL) Foreign government websites
 - (S//REL) Terrorist/Extremist web forums
 - (S//REL) Malware Domains (callback or beacon addresses)
 - (S//REL) U.S. Government websites via Request for Technical Assistance from Homeland Security
- (S//REL) Currently used to support Battle Damage Indication after CNA and for Situation Awareness
- (S//REL) OPSEC: unattributable to the USG

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL FVEY



1+1=2

- ► NSA "kills based on meta data" –Michael Hayden (former NSA director)
- DNS makes it trivial to gather meta data about most Internet activities

"The Domain Name System is the Achilles heel of the Web." -Tim Berners-Lee




Where We Are





JTRIG: Übertrolls of the Internet





Encryption to the Rescue?

- Centralized Internet infrastructure is easily controlled¹:
 - Number resources (IANA)
 - Domain Name System (Root zone)
 - DNSSEC root certificate
 - X.509 CAs (HTTPS certificates)
 - Major browser vendors (CA root stores!)
- Encryption does not help if PKI is compromised!
- Encryption alone does not protect meta data




The GNU Name System (GNS)²

Properties of GNS

- Decentralized name system with secure memorable names
- Provides alternative public key infrastructure
- Interoperable with DNS
- Achieves query and response privacy


²Joint work with Martin Schanzenbach and Matthias Wachs isé **(initial**)

Zone Management: like in DNS





Name resolution in GNS






▶ Bob can locally reach his webserver via www.gnu



Secure introduction




▶ Bob gives his public key to his **friends**, possibly via QR code



Delegation





- Alice learns Bob's public key
- ▶ Alice creates delegation to zone K_{pub}^{Bob} under label **bob**
- ► Alice can reach Bob's webserver via www.bob.gnu
































































GNS as PKI (via DANE/TLSA)




as a kernel

The Hurd, GNU's own kernel, is some way from being ready for daily use. Thus, GNU is typically used today with a kernel called Linux. This combination is the GNU/Linux operating system. GNU/Linux is used by millions, though many call it "Linux" by mistake.





Privacy Issue: DHT





Query Privacy: Terminology

```
G generator in ECC curve, a point n size of ECC group, n:=|G|, n prime x private ECC key of zone (x\in\mathbb{Z}_n) P public key of zone, a point P:=xG I label for record in a zone (I\in\mathbb{Z}_n) R_{P,I} set of records for label I in zone P q_{P,I} query hash (hash code for DHT lookup) R_{P,I} block with encrypted information for label I
```

in zone P published in the DHT under $q_{P,I}$



Query Privacy: Cryptography

Publishing records $R_{P,I}$ as $B_{P,I}$ under key $q_{P,I}$

$$h := H(I, P)$$
 (1)
 $d := h \cdot x \mod n$ (2)
 $B_{P,I} := S_d(E_{HKDF(I,P)}(R_{P,I})), dG$ (3)
 $q_{P,I} := H(dG)$ (4)

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Searching for records under label *I* in zone *P*

$$h := H(I, P)$$

$$q_{P,I} := H(hP) = H(hxG) = H(dG) \Rightarrow \text{obtain } B_{P,I}$$

$$R_{P,I} = D_{HKDF(I,P)}(B_{P,I})$$

$$(5)$$

$$(6)$$

$$R_{P,I} = D_{HKDF(I,P)}(B_{P,I})$$

$$(7)$$

The ".zkey" zone

- ".zkey" is another pTLD, in addition to ".gnu"
- ▶ In "LABEL.zkey", the "LABEL" is a public key of a zone
- "alice.bob.KEY.zkey" is perfectly legal
- ⇒ Globally unique identifiers



Key revocation

- Revocation message signed with private key (ECDSA)
- ► Flooded on all links in P2P overlay, stored forever
- Efficient set reconciliation used when peers connect
- Expensive proof-of-work used to limit DoS-potential
- Proof-of-work can be calculated ahead of time
- Revocation messages can be stored off-line if desired



NICKnames

- "alice.bob.carol.dave.gnu" is a bit long for Edward (".gnu")
- ► Also, we need to trust Bob, Carol and Dave (for each lookup)
- Finally, Alice would have liked to be called Krista (just Bob calls her Alice)

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- "NICK" records allow Krista to specify her preferred NICKname
- ► GNS adds a "NICK" record to each record set automatically
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- Memorable, short trust path in the future! TOFU!
- Krista better pick a reasonably unique NICK.



Shadow Records

- Records change
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- ▶ DHT propagation has higher delays, compared to DNS

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- DHT propagation has higher delays, compared to DNS
- SHADOW is a flag in a record
- Shadow records are only valid if no other, non-expired record of the same type exists




Fun GNS record types

- ▶ BOX: store TLSA records with A/AAAA record
- VPN: TCP/IP services hosted in GNUnet
- ▶ PHONE: have a conversation
- CERT: store your GPG public key (WiP)
- ► TOR: store your hidden service descriptor (WiP)




Zooko's Triangle



A name system can only fulfill two!




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DNS, ".onion" IDs and /etc/hosts/ are representative designs.



Zooko's Triangle





Do you have any questions?

References:

- Nathan Evans and Christian Grothoff. R5N. Randomized Recursive Routing for Restricted-Route Networks. 5th International Conference on Network and System Security, 2011.
- Matthias Wachs, Martin Schanzenbach and Christian Grothoff. On the Feasibility of a Censorship Resistant Decentralized Name System. 6th International Symposium on Foundations & Practice of Security, 2013.
- M. Schanzenbach Design and Implementation of a Censorship Resistant and Fully Decentralized Name System. Master's Thesis (TUM), 2012.

"Totalitarianism is man's escape from the fearful realities of life into the virtual womb of the leader. (...) The mystic center is in control of everything; man need no longer assume responsibility for his own life. The order and logic of the prenatal world reign. There is peace and silence, the peace of utter submission."

-Joost A. Merloo, Rape of the Mind (1956)



The NSA's TREASUREMAP





Little Horror Show of Internet Security

- MAC address spoofing, MAC address tracking, packet sniffing
- ► IP address spoofing, IPv6 tracking, packet sniffing, geo-blocking
- BGP traffic redirection (sniffing, malicious endpoint), route instability, topology discovery
- ► TCP SYN flooding, RST injection, TCP sequence prediction, port scanning, TCP unfriendlyness (DoS), connection sniffing
- DNS cache poisoning, distributed reflection DoS, domain lock-up, phantom domain/random subdomain/NXDOMAIN DoS, DNS tunneling & DNS fragmentation, NSEC(3) zone walking attacks
- TLS renegotiation, version rollback, BEAST, LOGJAM, POODLE, CRIME, BEACH, RC4, Truncation & FREAK attacks




Internet

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HTTPS/TCP/WLAN/




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Google
DNS/X.509
TCP/UDP
IP/BGP
Ethernet
Phys. Layer

CADET (AxolotI+SCTP)

R⁵N DHT

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Internet

Applications
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Applications?

- Anonymous file-sharing (gnunet-fs-gtk)
- Conversation (gnunet-conversation-gtk)
- Asynchronous messaging
 (https://pond.imperialviolet.org/)
- Synchronous messaging (http://www.matrix.org/)
- Social networking (http://www.secushare.org/)
- Payment (http://www.taler.net/)
- **.**...



Conclusion

- Decentralization is necessary
- ▶ Decentralization creates challenges for research:
 - Privacy-enhancing network protocol design
 - Secure software implementations
 - Software engineering and system architecture
 - Programming languages and tool support

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We must decentralize or accept authocracy and planetary collapse.





Namecoin

- ► Memorable: Check
- ► Global: Check
- Secure: different adversary model!
- ⇒ Availability of names (registration rate) is restricted
- \Rightarrow Adversary must not have 51% compute power

