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1== testbed == 1testbed api is now quite complete
2 2 * problem with reconfigure was a bug in the testbed service
3padding: PACKED / NETWORK_STRUCT don't really pack some misaligned structs: 3 * only thing left to to is to implement arm for manageService
4 struct GNUNET_TESTBED_PeerConfigurationInformationMessage 4 * (BUT: I don't get how arm works in conjunction with testbed -- when the arm api can't connect to
5is misaligned anyway, *but* sizeof the struct is 84, when it should be 82! 5 arm it tries to start the arm service *locally*, which is often wrong ...)
6 6 * talked to sriharsha about it
7see https://gnunet.org/bugs/view.php?id=3043 7
8 8gnunet-java finally has a proper stream tokenizer ...
9I managed to break testbed (this is a GNUNET_assert, no GNUNET_break) 9 * and locking has been removes from Scheduler, Helper is properly implemented
10 Sep 24 20:06:14-146897 testbed-18586 ERROR Assertion failed at testing.c:1548. 10
11but this only occurs *after* the shutdown and when trying to reconfigure a peer! 11new java API implementation for identity :)
12 12 * why is there no way to import keys?
13OPTIONS/PREFIX does not work with testbed helper 13 * at least API-wise
14 14 * voting should use identity ...
15what works (and is tested) now in org.gnunet.testbed: 15
16 * creating and destroying peers 16timing information in ballot: we talked about round times,
17 * starting and stopping peers 17but shouldn't this be done transparently by consensus?
18 * getting peer id / configuration 18aren't START_TIME, CLOSING_TIME, QUERY_TIME, END_TIME and maybe CONSENSUS_PARAMS be enough?
19 * overlay-connecting two peers 19
20other stuff: 20certificate authority: is the CAs pubkey different from its peer?
21 * does gnunet-java need barriers? 21 * it definitely makes sense to have it seperate for other cert methods
22 * what's the state of the overlay implementation 22 * like sending a cert per email, snail mail, social network ...
23 * does service_connect do anything other than retrieve the configuration? 23 * how do we specify how to reach the cert? one peer? multiple peers?
24 * primary purpose is to be able to have opqueue management, right? 24 * maybe use GADS? (I know very little about GADS right now)
25 * why do we have manage service when we have arm? 25 * does it even make sense to have the CA service at this time?
26 * someone has to start arm, I suppose?
27
28== crypto ==
29two types of public keys, do I understand the reasons correctly:
30 * NaCl compatibility
31 * fastest representation for each type of operation
32
33why is there no way to convert from signing key -> encryption key?
34 * other way around is not possible
35
36
37== voting ==
38 26
39what now works: 27what now works:
40 * creating a ballot and registering it 28 * authorities check for double vote submission, late / early voting, early result query,
41 * selecting a choice in the ballot and submitting it 29 double registering, vouchers (I don't like to call vouchers receipts because that term has
42 * vote + 512-bit ballot GUID 30 a certain meaning in voting literature already)
43 * querying the results (also with the GUID)
44
45next steps??
46- Ballot: (a) voter ID, (b) election information, (c) election eligibility group (Bavaria 18+), (d) ballot GUID
47- no double submission: check: no duplicate voter ID (for any given election)
48- no early queries
49- voter <--> CA interaction
50 => ideally, CA has a list of voter public keys or at least a policy (i.e. "accept all")
51 for a certain voter group (i.e. Bavaria 18+).
52 => CA also has a private CA key (surprise!)
53 => Voter has voter public key and voter group, sends THOSE to CA;
54 => CA signs: this voter is in this voter group (with expiration time for signature!)
55 => voter takes signature, can re-use it for ALL elections with this voter group
56- Authorities have CA public keys, check voter group sigs.
57
58what should be stored in the ballot about authorities: peer identities or peer public keys?
59=> public keys
60
61 * pubkey makes more sense, but I have the feeling that GNUnet prefers to use
62 peer IDs whenever possible
63=> Nah.
64
65docs of identity service say:
66 For giving names to other users and manage their public keys securely, we use GNS.
67In what way does GNS manage public keys?
68 GNS allows you to give names to other user's public keys.
69Does GNS in any way relate peer identities to public keys?
70 No.
71
72persistent storage of tallies?
73 => Later.
74 31
75now that the pubkey is smaller, are there reasons for still having 32but: group certs are not checked right now
76a separate peer identity?
77 * except for that it would be a lot of work to change now
78=> exactly.
79 33
80the command line took looks a bit complicated now, any suggestions? 34how to test voting without waiting too long or missing the right time?
81=> Later.
82 35
83asking permission to vote should not require the private key, right? 36any progress on crypto?
84 * how do we do this interface-wise? pubkey on the command line? 37 * luckily the private key has the same size, so identity can be used
85=> Identity service, ego!
86 38
87== general java stuff == 39next:
88what's your opinion on option types: should they be used more in gnunet-java? 40 * use identity
41 * multiple authorities should do consensus on unencrypted votes
42 * tests for this with testbed
43 * encrypting votes
89 44
90We have a lot of callbacks in java that all do almost the same. Should we have a generic callback type? 45suggestions?
91 46