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@@ -152,6 +152,7 @@ and @pxref{Deniability}.
* How file-sharing achieves Anonymity::
+* How messaging provides Anonymity::
@end menu
Providing anonymity for users is the central goal for the anonymous
@@ -231,6 +232,30 @@ GAP --- practical anonymous networking. In Proceedings of
Designing Privacy Enhancing Technologies, 2003.
+@cindex How messaging provides Anonymity
+@node How messaging provides Anonymity
+@subsection How messaging provides Anonymity
+While the file-sharing tries to achieve anonymity through hiding actions in
+other traffic, the messaging service provides a weaker form of protection
+against identification.
+The messaging service allows the use of an anonymous ego for the signing and
+verification process of messages instead of a unique ego. This anonymous ego is
+a publically known key pair which is shared between all peers in GNUnet.
+Using this ego only ensures that individual messages alone can't identify its
+sender inside of a messenger room. It should be clarified that the route of
+the traffic for each message can still be tracked to identify the senders peer
+inside of a messenger room if the threat agent controls certain peers hosting
+the room.
+Also opening a room in the messenger service will potentially match your peer
+identity with the internal member identity from the messenger service. So
+despite using the anonymous ego you can reveal your peer identity. This means
+to decrease the chance of being identified, it is recommended to enter rooms but
+you should not open them for others.
@cindex Deniability
@node Deniability
@section Deniability