commit 5eb2c6b9d391861037b89546b7cc9a48c8cee462
parent afe88adb7247c72f393bfe0b90d23bd5af934402
Author: Nils Gillmann <ng0@n0.is>
Date: Sun, 7 Oct 2018 11:03:58 +0000
format fix
Signed-off-by: Nils Gillmann <ng0@n0.is>
Diffstat:
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/gnunetbib.bib b/gnunetbib.bib
@@ -6720,7 +6720,7 @@ The algorithms have been implemented in a middleware called the Distributed k-ar
publisher = {ACM Press},
organization = {ACM Press},
address = {New York, NY, USA},
- abstract = {We create a credential system that lets a user anonymously authenticate at most $n$ times in a single time period. A user withdraws a dispenser of n e-tokens. She shows an e-token to a verifier to authenticate herself; each e-token can be used only once, however, the dispenser automatically refreshes every time period. The only prior solution to this problem, due to Damg{\r a}rd et al. [29], uses protocols that are a factor of k slower for the user and verifier, where k is the security parameter. Damg{\r a}rd et al. also only support one authentication per time period, while we support n. Because our construction is based on e-cash, we can use existing techniques to identify a cheating user, trace all of her e-tokens, and revoke her dispensers. We also offer a new anonymity service: glitch protection for basically honest users who (occasionally) reuse e-tokens. The verifier can always recognize a reused e-token; however, we preserve the anonymity of users who do not reuse e-tokens too often},}
+ abstract = {We create a credential system that lets a user anonymously authenticate at most $n$ times in a single time period. A user withdraws a dispenser of n e-tokens. She shows an e-token to a verifier to authenticate herself; each e-token can be used only once, however, the dispenser automatically refreshes every time period. The only prior solution to this problem, due to Damg{\r a}rd et al. [29], uses protocols that are a factor of k slower for the user and verifier, where k is the security parameter. Damg{\r a}rd et al. also only support one authentication per time period, while we support n. Because our construction is based on e-cash, we can use existing techniques to identify a cheating user, trace all of her e-tokens, and revoke her dispensers. We also offer a new anonymity service: glitch protection for basically honest users who (occasionally) reuse e-tokens. The verifier can always recognize a reused e-token; however, we preserve the anonymity of users who do not reuse e-tokens too often},
keywords = {clone detection, credentials, n-anonymous authentication},
isbn = {1-59593-518-5},
doi = {10.1145/1180405.1180431},
