commit 74d3fa2b09a31129661b923cbf36f37c7bcbcb3d
parent e2bc928a400f5ea14ace81691d641ba7dc814918
Author: Martin Schanzenbach <schanzen@gnunet.org>
Date: Sat, 19 Feb 2022 16:09:47 +0100
remove some we's
Diffstat:
1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
diff --git a/draft-schanzen-gns.xml b/draft-schanzen-gns.xml
@@ -412,7 +412,7 @@
<dd>
is a zone key derivation function which blinds a private key d
using label, resulting in another private key which
- can be used to create cryptographic signatures. We note that
+ can be used to create cryptographic signatures.
GNS only requires a signature to be created directly with
d to sign a revocation message for the zone key zk.
</dd>
@@ -497,7 +497,7 @@
Base32GNS-Encode and Base32GNS-Decode, respectively.
</t>
<t>
- For the string representation of a zTLD we define:
+ The string representation of a zTLD is:
</t>
<artwork name="" type="" align="left" alt=""><![CDATA[
zkl := Base32GNS-Encode(ztype||zkey)
@@ -618,8 +618,8 @@ zTLD := zkl[126..129].zkl[63..125].zkl[0..62]
at least D leading zeroes are found in the hash result.
D is then referred to as the difficulty of the PoW.
In order to reduce the variance in time it takes to calculate the
- PoW, we require that a number Z different PoWs must be
- found that on average have D leading zeroes.
+ PoW, a valid GNS revocation requires that a number Z different PoWs
+ must be found that on average have D leading zeroes.
</t>
<t>
The resulting proofs may then published and disseminated. The concrete
@@ -960,8 +960,7 @@ zTLD := zkl[126..129].zkl[63..125].zkl[0..62]
curve parameters of the twisted Edwards representation
of Curve25519 <xref target="RFC7748" /> (a.k.a. Ed25519)
with the ECDSA scheme <xref target="RFC6979" />.
- Consequently, we use the following naming convention for our
- cryptographic primitives for PKEY zones:
+ The following naming convention is used for the cryptographic primitives of PKEY zones:
</t>
<dl>
<dt>d</dt>
@@ -1142,8 +1141,8 @@ S-Decrypt(zk,label,expiration,ciphertext):
of Curve25519 <xref target="RFC7748" /> (a.k.a. Ed25519)
with the Ed25519 scheme <xref target="ed25519" /> as specified in
<xref target="RFC8032" />.
- Consequently, we use the following naming convention for our
- cryptographic primitives for EDKEY zones:
+ The following naming convention is used for the
+ cryptographic primitives of EDKEY zones:
</t>
<!-- Check if we want to use RFC8032 instead of paper ed25519 -->
<dl>
@@ -1236,7 +1235,7 @@ ZKDF-Public(zk,label):
return zk'
]]></artwork>
<t>
- We note that implementers SHOULD employ a constant time scalar
+ Implementers SHOULD employ a constant time scalar
multiplication for the constructions above to protect against
timing attacks. Otherwise, timing attacks may leak private key
material if an attacker can predict when a system starts the
@@ -1281,7 +1280,7 @@ ZKDF-Public(zk,label):
A nonce is calculated from the highest 32 bytes of the
expansion of the private key d and the blinding factor h.
The nonce is then hashed with the message to r.
- This way, we include the full derivation path in the calculation
+ This way, the full derivation path is included in the calculation
of the R value of the signature, ensuring that it is never reused
for two different derivation paths or messages.
</t>
@@ -1638,8 +1637,8 @@ S-Decrypt(zk,label,expiration,ciphertext):
To be useful, the API MUST permit storing at least 176 byte values
to be able to support the defined zone delegation record encodings,
and SHOULD allow at least 1024 byte values.
- We assume that an implementation realizes two procedures on top of a
- storage:
+ In the following, it is assumed that an implementation realizes two
+ procedures on top of a storage:
</t>
<artwork name="" type="" align="left" alt=""><